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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
A. E. UPTON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
L. H. HEISELT, RAY HEISELT, V. 
M. SAMUELS, MRS. V. M. SAMU-
ELS, ELIZABETH BREEN, L. R. 
WATTIS COMPANY, a Corpora-
tion, W A TTIS SAMUELS COM- Case No. 7430 
P ANY, a Corporation, and HEISEL T 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Corporation, and Unknown Heirs, 
Defendants, 
L. H. HEISEL T and HEISEL T CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, a Cor-
poration, Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTROVERT-
ED IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARSr. 
In paragraph 1 of Appellants' Statement of Facts near 
the end they say ((for about seven years prior thereto" (Tr. 
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1). With respect to the payment of taxes for seven years a 
perusal of the Complaint, Transcript Page 3, at the top of 
the page and the last clause of what is paragraph 2 continued 
from the preceding page reads, CCAnd that the Plaintiff now 
is and ever since the 29th day of. May, 1941, has been the 
owner in fee simple of all the real estate hereinafter described." 
On this point a review of Plaintiff's Exhibits S, T and U shows 
that there was a payment by the Plaintiff to the County for 
tax deeds in January of 1937, also a payment by the Plaintiff 
to the County for tax deeds and auditor's deeds in May 1941, 
and that the taxes for the years 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 
1946, 1947 and 1948, were paid by the Plaintiff after he ob-
tained the auditor's tax deeds from the County on the 29th 
~ay of May, 1941. 
A perusal of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Page 3 of the Tran-
script of Record will disclose that the statement ccfor about 
seven years prior thereto" refers to the period prior to January 
4, 1937, and the inference from the Statement of Facts of 
the Appellants that the taxes hadn't been paid by the Plaintiff 
Respondent for a period of seven years as is required under 
adverse possession is not a fact. 
As to Paragraph 2 of Appellants' Brief, Page 4, the Re-
spondent controverts the impression gained from that para-
graph. Although the allegations of L. H. Heiselt's Answer 
may have denied the validity of the tax deeds, later on and 
in the evidence and in the pretrial statement, it is shown that 
the validity· of the tax deeds is tacitly admitted and was 
admitted in the pretrial under the following circumstances: 
On Page 21 of the Transcript, Paragraph 4 reads, 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:-' -:L~ .. · ·; ·":~((It is stipulated that. Plaintiffs Exhibits A~ B~· C, D, 
~· :: \. ·,'·~: E, F and G attached to Plaintiffs Complaint may be 
admitted in evidence by the Plaintiff. The Defendants 
represented, however, do not admit the legal effete of 
the said Exhibits and do not admit the Plaintiff obtained 
title therefrom except as trustee." 
Also on Page 121 of the Transcript, at paragraphs 7 and 8, 
HThe Court finds that the only issues involved in the 
presentaton of the Plaintiff's case on the Complaint 
will be: (a) The adverse possession alleged in the Plain-
tiff, which the Defendant denies, claiming that the 
possession was held in trust. (b) Whether the Plain-
tiff made improvements and the amount thereof." 
Therefore, paragraph 2 of the Appellants' Brief at Page 4 
is misleading in that the Defendants admit that in legal effect 
the deeds represented by Plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, 
F and G are valid if received by the grantee therein as trustee. 
That is no doubt why the Court in its paragraph 7 quoted above 
stated what the issues involved in the presentation of the 
Plaintiffs case would be. It was discussed at the pretrial 
as to whether proof of deed could be made· of these deeds 
":"'the preliminary procedures leading up thereto, and it was 
decided that the only issues involved in the presentation of 
the Plaintiffs case were those set forth in paragraph 7 (a) 
and (b) in the pretrial statement above referred to (Tr. Page 
121). Attention is called to the fact that the counsel for 
Appellants signed that as a fair statement of the pretrial. 
Referring to paragraph 3 of Appellants' Brief, Page 4, 
that paragraph, like many of the others, is merely a reference 
to what was alleged, and not what was proven. The record. 
shows that V. M. Samuels made no claim to any of these lots 
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or to an interest in them. At Transcript 120, paragraph 1, it 
is shown that the appearance of V. M. Samuels and Mrs. V. 
M. Samuels by way of demurrer which was never served was 
stricken from the files and the default of V. M. Samuels and 
Mrs. V. M. Samuels was entered by the Court. It is to be 
further noted that this case was set down for trial on the June 
calendar of 1949 (Tr. Page 109), then later referred back 
to the presiding Judge (Tr. Page 110), then set down for trial 
in the September term of the Court ( T r. Page 111) . In the 
meantime, the month of August, 1949, the Appellants herein 
procured from V. M. Samuels some quit-claim deeds to some 
of the properties mentioned in the Complaint and the record 
shows further that Exhibits 29, 30 ·and 31 of Defendants are 
those quit-claim deeds. The record shows that the grantor, 
V. M. Samuels, was not in the chain of title, except perhaps 
as to partial interest in one of the lots, to-wit, 36, and it is 
quite questionable whether the abstract of title would show 
that. (See Tr. Pages 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, · 390 and 
391.) 
As to the fourth paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 
4, the fact is that, in the amending of the answers and counter-
claims in many respects, the issues are resolved to a quiet 
title action. The Defendants base their sole defenses on a 
partnership relationship, a trust relationship, and1or a co-tenancy 
relationship (Tr. 31-40, 125-127). It is to be noted as a 
matter of fact that this action went to trial on the basis of 
these defenses and no other. Attention is called to the fact 
that the Defendants never through the whole record brought 
up the matter of a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship and 
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brought it up for the first time in this action upon appeal to 
this Supreme Court. 
The Respondent concedes paragraph 5 of the Appellants' 
Statement of Facts (Appellants' Brief, Page 4). 
As to the ~ixth paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 4, 
the Appellants indicate that the record shows that none of 
the Defendants, other than themselves, have any interest in 
the property. Respondent contends that the fact is that the 
records show that none of the Defendants have any interest 
in the property. 
As to the first full paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 
5, Respondent admits that it is a nice thing to assist the Court 
in clarifying different individuals; however, the record does 
not show that Heiselt Construction Company was not qualified 
to do business in the State of Colorado, and also the Respond-
ent contends that the record does not show that L. H. Heiselt, 
Heiselt Construction Company and V. M. Samuels owned 
the lots in Salt Lake City, title to which the Plaintiff sought 
to quiet in him. As a matter of fact, the record shows that 
the Bankruptcy Court in Denver in the order contained in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit J ruled that the Defendant, L. H. Heiselt, had 
no interest whatever in any of the real properties sought to 
be quieted in the Plaintiff in this action, that the Heiselt Con-
struction Company formerly owned only a partial. interest in 
some of the lots. Therefore, Appellants' statement in this 
paragraph does not conform with the facts in the record. This 
is also borne out in Plaintiff's Exhibit H, which is the abstract 
of title to this property in which the title is being sought to 
be quieted in the Plaintiff Respondent. 
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In regard to the second full parag~aph of Appellants' 
Brief at Page 5, the testimony of L. H. Heiselt is that William 
J. Christensen did some work for L. H. Heiselt and Heiselt 
Construction· Company in the year 1936; did some work in 
1938 and 1939 .. The record does not show that he was given 
a power of attorney in 1941 or 1942, nor during that time was 
he associated with Ben Roberts in the filing of a suit for L. H. 
Heiselt, Incorporated, v. Brown-Schrepferman Co. It will be 
noted that the record shows (Tr. ·Page 3 75-381) in the testi-
mony of Heiselt that William J. Christensen assisted Ben 
Roberts in the preparation and filing of a complaint in the 
suit of L. H .Hieselt, Incorporated, v. Brown-Schrepferman 
Co. in the latter part of December, 1938. 
The third full paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 5, 
does not reflect the true facts as shown by the record. In the 
middle of Page 381 of the Transcript, in answer to a question: 
t t I told him that there was some railroad tracks down 
there at the yard that were on tbe Utah Construction 
ground, the yard, that we would have to get them, that 
it was my rail." 
((The Court: This should be confined to this prop-
erty. There is no need of adding anything about per-
sonal property unless it pertains to this particular 
d '' groun ... 
And at Transcript Page 382: 
((I told him to take them off, that 'we had orders to 
pick the track up and sell the rail ... " 
((The Court: I don't think this is material. His 
testimony about the tracks is stricken.'' 
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Referring to the first paragraph of Page 6 of Appellants' 
Brief, it states on May 4, 1936, an account was opened in the 
National City Bank in the name of L. I-I. Heiselt; the record 
does not show this. In fact, .it is shown by Defendants' .Ex .. 
hibit 14, the statement of account of the National City Bank 
of Denver in the name of L. H. Heiselt, that on May 1, 1936 
there was a balance carry-over from the previous month ,of 
$214.91. Exhibit 9 referred to by the Appellants is not a 
bank statement, and the testimony of· Upton shows definitely 
that he knew nothing about that and had nothing to do with 
it (Tr. 239, 244, 245). So let us refer to Exhibit 14 again; 
it shows a deposit of $1,000 on May 11, a deposit of $1,000.00 
on May 18 to the account of L. H. Heiselt, but there is no 
showing of who made the deposits. The testimony in the 
record shows that there were loans from Peterson and Upton, 
each for $1,000.00, and these may have been the deposits 
indicated on May 11 and May 18 of $1,000.00 each, but the 
record shows that those were merely loans and the statement 
in the Appellants' Brief, above referred to- Page 6, first 
paragraph thereof-is not borne out by the testimony that 
Peterson deposited or that Upton deposited the $1,000.00 
deposits. The statement that other deposits were subsequently 
made by Peterson and Upton is not borne out by the record. 
The record does show that L. H. Heiselt and Heiselt Con-
struction Company received further loans and they may or 
may not have been deposited in these accounts (Tr. pp. 226, 
227, 342,431, 432, 433, 434). However, they probably were, but 
not by Upton or Peterson. Referring to the Exhibit 14, the 
second sheet thereof, the balance on June 1, 1936, was $1.89. 
There is no showing in the record that there was ever a transfer 
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of the account of L. H. Heiselt to Heiselt Construction Com-
pany. The Plaintiff's Exhibit P showing the July 1 balance 
of $1,3 36.5 7 is the first of the bank statements of Heiselt 
Construction Company. There may have been a previous 
statement to Heiselt Construction Company, but when this 
bank account was opened or whether it was transferred from 
L. H. Heiselt account or not is not borne out by the record. 
It would make no difference if it was. 
In the second full paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 
6, it is stated that conferences were had with L. R. Wattis, 
who at the time apparently represented certain companies. It 
seems that Appellants beg the question by using the word 
Ctapparently." There is no showing that L. R. Wattis rep-
resented any of these companies or had written power of at-
torney as required by the Statute of Frauds. Appellants claim 
that Upton went to the office of Ben E. Roberts in the Newhouse 
Building and dictated an Option Agreement, Exhibit 3, which 
was signed by Wattis for all of these companies. The record 
definitely shows that none of the contesting Defendants or 
their witnesses knew who dictated this option and that it is 
denied by Upton that he dictated it (Tr. 207). 
The last paragraph on Page 6 of Appellants' Brief is 
controverted by the Respondent in this respect: that the record 
does not show that A. E. Upton accepted the option, Exhibit 
3. In fact, the telegram referred to of July 4th was signed by 
L. H. Heiselt and he admitted signing it, (Exhibit 18) al-
though the body of that telegram may have been written by 
A. E. Upton, and was an acceptance as a matter of fact, if an 
acceptance at all, by L. H. Heiselt. The said option, Exhibit 
10 
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3, states that it runs to L. H. Heiselt and A. E. Upton, or 
either of them. (Tr. 207, 234, 238, 247, 275, 292 to 302, 449, 
450). 
Referring to first full paragraph of Page 7 of Appellants' 
Brief, the check for $400.00 referred to was a check drawn 
by L. H. Heiselt; it was his own check, which is Exhibit 16 
(Tr. 247). 
The · second full paragraph of Page 7 of Appellants' 
Brief is controverted. The record shows that the exercising 
of the option, Exhibit 3, is purely an individual matter of 
L. H. Heiselt (Tr. 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 234, 238, 247, 
275, 292-305, 341, 342, 449, 450). (Exhibits 2, 15 and 18). 
The third full paragraph of Page 7, Appellants' Brief, 
is misleading in that it was not a check of A. E. Upton but 
was a Heiselt Construction Company check and was issued, 
as per the testimony of A. E. Upton, at the request of L. H. 
Heiselt (Tr. 458). 
The last paragraph of Page 7, Appellants' Brief, is mis-
leading in view of the testimony of A. E. Upton that he knew 
nothing of this and it was purely a matter of sending the 
conveyances to a bank for collection, and the quit-claim deed, 
(Exhibit 1) as shown by the testimony of A. E. Upton, never 
came to the personal attention of A. E. Upton but was handled 
in the usual course of business of the bank, if handled at all 
(Tr. 255). 
First full paragraph of Page 8, Appellants' Brief gives 
the impression that a fee was paid to Ben E. Roberts of $300.00, 
Exhibit 34. The Court's attention is called to the fact that 
11 
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this Exhibit is personal check· of L. H. Heiselt to Ben E. 
Roberts.. There is no showing in the record as to what that 
check was for (Tr. 459). 
In the second full paragraph of Page 8, Appellants' 
Brief, we note a correction in the body of the indented part 
of the letter (Exhibit 5), the fourth line should read uwith 
instructions from," instead of "for." 
The last paragraph of Page 8 of Appellants' Brief is 
controverted. The second sentence reads ((For the services 
rendered by Mr. Roberts, he was paid $200.00 by check dated 
September 1, 1937." The records do not show that such 
check was paid for any such services, and it was the check of 
L. H. Heiselt, Incorporated, a Colorado Corporation (Tr. 
Page 215, 230, 232). 
The first full paragraph of Page 9, Appelants' Brief, is 
controverted in this: there· is no showing in the record that the 
option agreement was ever taken by the Plaintiff in this action; 
in fact, it is denied it was ever taken and the record shows 
that it was never exercised by Plaintiff; and it is very indefinite 
as to what taxes are referred to therein,-there is land in 
California and other places (Tr. 212, 214, 233). In fact, 
that option agreement, Exhibit 3, is very general and does not 
specifically describe the land in this action. The second .sentence 
of the paragraph is misleading in that said payments were 
made out of some account opened in the National City Bank, 
Denver, and it is not indicated what accounts are meant. It 
may have been an L. H. Heiselt account, Heiselt Construction 
Company account, or L. H. Heiselt, Incorporated, account. 
It is not shown by the record. It is further noted that the im~ 
12 
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pression trying to be conveyed by the Appellants· is that the 
i . . 
payments were made out of, for and on behalf of and from 
this account by Upton to take the tax deed in 1937. The 
record definitely shows that the check for $1225.00 used to 
buy the title from the County in January, 193 7, was a personal 
check of A. E. Upton from his own personal account and with 
his own personal money, and that is admitted in the pretrial 
statement by the contesting Defendants herein (Tr. 120, 121, 
210, 233). 
The second full paragraph of Page 9 of Appellants' Brief 
is misleading in this respect: In the first sentence it is said 
ttthat at the time the property was purchased from the county." 
It is not shown which purchase is referred to, whether the 
one of January, 1937, or the May sale of 1941. The quit-
claim deed referred to from L. R. W attis Company to Heiselt 
is Exhibit 1 and was never recorded until in May of 1946, .as 
stamped · on the Exhibit. The second sentence of the said 
paragraph states the deed was being held by the National 
City Bank. It was held by the bank for collection, but never 
under the personal control of Upton (Tr. 255). Further, 
Upton's testimony undenied was that he had never seen that 
instrument, that it may have been at the bank and it may have 
been turned over to Mr. Buckle, but not to his know ledge as 
to that specific instrument (Tr. 255). He has much business 
as he stated and can't be bothered by the details which are 
taken care of by the personnel of the bank. In so far as all 
references to Mr. Frank McLaughlin, the Referee in Bank-
ruptcy in Denver, and all of the transactions that transpired 
between Buckle and Dunn and Heiselt and the Referee in 
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Bankruptcy, the records show that it was an attempted com-
promise (Tr. 372-374). 
As to the last paragraph of Page 9 of Appellants' Brief 
it is noted that the Appellants are attempting to show that 
the facts are that Upton purchased the property here in ques-
tion in the May sale of 1941, from Salt Lake County, while the 
deed (Exhibit 1) was in the hands of the bank (Tr. 225). It is 
a general practice of people to send matters to banks for col-
lection or to be handled by the personnel of the bank. Let 
it be noted here that the National City Bank of Denver is a 
separate legal entity from the Plaintiff, A. E. Upton. 
The first paragraph of Page 10 of Appellants' Brief is 
controverted. In the second line thereof, Appellants state, 
((in the matter of making a complete settlement.-" The records 
show that there was not any complete settlement (Tr. 252, 
358-375) (Ex. 17, 37, 38). The records show that it was 
entirely a matter of Heiselt going to Denver trying to negotiate 
some kind of compromise as is pointed out by the Court in 
the rulings as to the admission of Exhibits 17, 37 and 38 (Tr. 
252, 358-375). Furthermore, the record shows that Exhibit 
17 is a copy of a letter and that the signature at the bottom 
is in Heiselt' s handwriting. In fact, Heiselt admitted in 
the record and in his testimony that he signed A. E. Upton's 
name at the bottom of that letter (Tr. 366). 
The last paragraph of Page 10 and the first and second 
paragraphs of Page 11 of Appellants' Brief, should be clari-
fied. The Appellants try to convey an. impression by using 
the word ((Settlement." In fact, the body of the instruments, 
Exhibits 3 7 and 38 and 17, if admissible, definitely show an 
14 
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__ attempted compromise, and the Court so ruled. (For the 
assistance of the Court, at the last sentence of the second para-
graph of Page 11 above referred to, the Appellants have the 
reference as Transcript 326; we believe it should be Transcript 
426). 
The last paragraph of Page 11, Appellants' Brief, is 
again purely a matter of attempted compro1nise, an extraneous 
matter in which A. E. Upton was not involved (Tr. 372-374). 
The Statement of Facts shown in Appellants' Brief on 
Pages 12, 13 and to the first full paragraph of Page 14, are 
controverted by the Respondent as being misleading and is 
concerned with some matters of conferences between A. E. 
Upton and V. M. Samuels. Let it be noted again that the 
record definitely shows that V. M. Samuels does not claim 
any interest whatsover in the subject matter of this action (Tr. 
120, 121). 
In the first full paragraph of Page 14, Appellants' Brief, 
Appellants make reference to Exhibit 9 as a bank account. 
Exhibit 9 is not a bank statement, was not prepared by the bank 
or A. E. Upton as shown by the evidence and testimony of 
A. E. Upton that he had never seen it before, and is no part 
of the bank records (Tr. 239, 244, 245). 
As to the second sentence of paragraph 1 herein men-
tioned, the record shows that at times the Heiselt Construction 
Company in pursuance of its jobs depleted its bank ac-
count (Tr. 265 to 274), and the record shows, undenied 
by Heiselt, that he requested Upton and Peterson to attempt 
to keep the men from quitting work for not receiving their 
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pay (Tr. 265 to 274, 448). All of these checks were issued 
in pursuance to the above request and upon promise of L. H. 
Heiselt to repay the monies (Tr. 431-448). All of these 
checks, including Exhibit 35, as the record and testimony of 
Heiselt shows, were for the railroad contracts and they have 
never been contested or protested by Heiselt or the Heiselt 
Construction Company (Tr. 434 to 448). 
Second full paragraph of Page 14, Appellants' Brief, is 
not true. In fact, the testimony of Mr. Heiselt and of Ben 
E. Roberts is that Mr. Roberts was fully aware and knew that 
A. E. Upton purchased the property in question in this action 
in the May sale of 1941. Mr. Roberts was there and he admits 
that he knew that it was brought by Ernest B. Upton for his 
brother, A. E. Upton (Tr. 485, 486). As far as the matter 
of V. M. Samuels or anyone else being on notice, the record 
is notice. It also might be noted that there is no showing that 
any of these contesting Defendants ever offered the County 
or Upton payment of the taxes, or attempted to redeem them 
at any time over a period of many years. And as for the last 
clause of the paragraph, referring to Samuels, or any other 
references to Samuels, it has no bearing on this matter so far 
as the Plaintiff. herein and contesting Defendants are concerned. 
The last paragraph of Page 14, Appellants' Brief is con-
troverted. T~ere is no evidence that William J. Christensen 
for many years was employed by Heiselt or Heiselt Construction 
Company, or either of them; or that they paid him any money 
as late as 1942 to represent them, or that he was in charge of 
any lots or put a man in possession of anything for and on 
behalf of Heiselt or the Heiselt Construction Company. In 
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fact, the testimony of L. H. Heiselt definitely shows 't~at. so 
far as the subject matter of this action is concerned there 
never was any employment of William J. Christensen in 
relation to these lands; that the employment in 1936 in Colo:-
rado and for a short time in 193 7 and the assistance given 
Ben Roberts on a brief in December of 1938, is the only such 
employment, except for the matter of the sale of some rail 
which \vas on Utah Construction Company property and the 
Defendant L. H. Heiselt' s statement and testimony shows that 
he \Yas ordered to take that off (Tr. 380, 381). This em-
ployment had nothing to do with the land here in question. 
Furthermore, in the last part of the paragraph which appears 
on Page 15, Appellants try to create the impression that the 
notice to Garff was given by the Heiselt Construction Company 
prior to the contract between Garff and Upton, which is untrue. 
The record shows to the contrary (Tr. 191, Ex. 1 and 42). 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action to quiet title to certain lands located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. At one time these lands 
were owned by a certain group of individuals, one of whom 
was the Heiselt Construction Company, which was formerly a 
part owner of part of these lands (Exhibit H). Early in January, 
1937, Respondent, A. E. Upton, purchased by tax deed from 
Salt Lake County for the sum of $1225.00 the property in 
dispute, and paid for the same with his personal check ( T r. 
120, 121, 210, 233, 323, 325, 327, Ex. D. E. F, and G). 
Mr. A. E. Upton and Mr. L. H. Heiselt, one of the Appellants 
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herein, orally agreed that Mr. Upton would permit Mr. Heiselt 
to purchase this property from him for the sum of $1225.00 
together with interest, provided that Mr. Heiselt paid the taxes 
on the said property as they became due each year thereafter 
(Tr. 250 and 251). At no time thereafter did Mr. Heiselt 
pay any of the taxes on the said property when due, or at 
all, and in 1941, said property again went to tax sale by Salt 
Lake County (Tr. 485, 486). At that time, Mr. A. E. Upton, 
the Respondent herein, had his brother, E. B. Upton, an attorney 
from Denver, Colorado, come to Salt Lake and bid on this 
property at the tax sale (Tr. 250, 251, 485, 486). At the 
time of the bidding, Mr. Ben E. Roberts, President of the 
Heiselt Construction Company, was present and heard Mr. 
E. B. Upton bid on this property and purchase it in the name 
of A. E. Upton (See Tr. 486). Ever since said date Mr. A. 
E. Upton has been in actual possession of said property, either 
personally or by agent, has paid all the taxes thereon (Tr. 
456, 45 7, Ex. S. T. U), and has insured said property against 
fire and has paid the premiums therefor (Ex. K, Tr. 279). 
Appellants herein admit that Mr. A. E. Upton purchased said 
lot at said tax sale, but claim the title which he obtained thereby 
was held in trust for the Appellants (Tr. 120, 121). At pre-
trial it was admitted that legal title vested in A. E. Upton 
and the sole question is whether or not this property was 
being held by A. E. Upton in trust for L. H. Heiselt, A. E. 
Upton and E. H. Peterson, either by virtue of a partnership, 
as a co-tenancy or an implied trust (Tr. 31-40, 120, 121, 125-
127). The lower Court- found that the evidence adduced 
by Appellants failed to prove the necessary elements of any 
trust, partnership, or co-tenancy. (See Findings of Fact, Con-
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elusions of Law, Tr. Page 152-155). The only evidence, if 
any, of a trust relationship contained in ·the record is in the 
testimony of L .H. Heiselt on direct examination. Appellant 
L. H. Heiselt, petitioned in bankruptcy in 1940, and in said 
bankruptcy Schedule A, he did not list · any obligation 
'vith respect to a debt to A. E. Upton as a mortgage or 
otherwise relative to the real estate involved in this action 
(Ex. J), and he did not in Schedule B in said bankruptcy list 
this real estate, or any parts thereof as an asset, nor did he 
list or mention any assets in or claims respecting this alleged 
partnership or any partnership or cotenancy whatever (Ex. 
J). L. H. Heiselt alleged that certain contracts executed in 
the name of the Heiselt Construction Company were actually 
performed by a partnership consisting of A. E. Upton, Elmer 
H. Peterson, and himself, but the proof at the trial failed to 
sustain any such allegations. The income tax returns of the 
Heis_elt Construction Company conclusively controvert the 
pa~tnership, trust and co-tenancy contentions in that all profits 
realized and all income realized from these construction projects 
were reported in the income tax returns of the Heiselt Con-
struction Company, a corporation, and taxes computed and 
paid thereon (Tr. 419-429, Ex. L, 25) and L. H. Heiselt admits 
no income tax returns for the alleged partnership were filed 
(Tr. 425). These Heiselt Construction Company returns cover 
the entire period alleged by Mr. Heiselt to represent the alleged 
partnership activity (Tr. Page 419-429). In addition, any 
partnership was denied by A. E. Upton (Tr. Page 489, 490). 
There is no evidence in the record at any place as to co-tenancy. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the contention 
of an implied trust. All of the facts claimed by Appellants 
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in their brief on· appeal are in support of the allegations of 
partQ.ership, rather than in support of the allegation of an 
implied trust, and the trial Court in its Findings of Fact found 
that the allegations of the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt as to 
partnership were not proven and not true ( T r. 15 2-15 5) . 
The contention propounded by the Appellants in their 
Brief as to a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship is first brought 
forth on appeal. Nowhere in the record is there any allega-
tion or claim that l\1r. Upton loaned money to the Appellant, 
Mr. Heiselt, and took title to this property as security for a 
loan. In fact, the record shows that L. H. Heiselt at the time 
of the 193 7 tax sale to A. E. Upton had no title whatsover 
to any of this property (Ex. H and J). The record shows 
that at most there was some oral conditional sales contract and 
that L. H. Heiselt failed to perform any of the terms thereof. 
If this mortgage claim had been alleged in the pleadings, it 
would have been possible for the Plaintiff to meet such claim 
and he could and would have met such a claim and refuted it. 
From the testimony adduced at the trial, the Court found 
for the Plaintiff in all particulars, found the facts as alleged 
by the Plaintiff to be true and the facts as alleged by the 
Defendant to be false (Tr. 152, 153, 154 and 155). 
The Plaintiff pleaded the statute of limitations and statute 
of frauds in his demurrers and also in his CtReply to Answer" 
and CtAnswers to Counterclaims." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON.· 
' ' I . I • • ~ ' 
• I ,.,.,r 
1. 1941 TAX SALE AND AUDITOR'S DEED PASSED 
TITLE IN FEE SIMPLE TO A .. E. UPTON. . . 
2. 1941 AUDITOR'S DEED-VALID. OR INVALID 
-CONSTITUTES COLOR OF TITLE AS A . BASIS OF 
TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION IN A. E. UPTON. 
3. A. E. UPTON ALSO PERFECTED TITLE IN FEE 
UNDER ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
4. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Respondent still relies on his allegations of Statute of 
Limitations wherever applicable. 
5. STATUTE OF FRAUD APPLIES. 
(a) All inadmissible evidence under the Statute of . Frauds 
relating to transfers of interest in this land, except as to implied 
trust which was not proved, is still relied upon by Respondent. 
6. NO IMPLIED TRUST PROVED. 
7. NO PARTNERSHIP PROVED. 
8. NO CO-TENANCY PROVED. 
9. MORTGAGOR - MORTGAGEE RELATIONSHIP 
IMMATERIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
1941 TAX SALE AND AUDITOR'S DEED PASSED 
TITLE IN FEE SIMPLE TO A. E. UPTON. 
Appellants herein concede that the tax deed obtained by 
A. E. Upton, Respondent herein, on May, 1941, conveyed title 
to Mr. Upton. They claim, however, it was conveyed to him 
purely in trust (Tr. Page 120, 121). If this deed is valid for 
the purpose of conveying title to him in trust, it is valid for 
all purposes, so far as procedural steps prior to the deeds are 
concerned, and if the trust failed, the deed is still valid as far 
as he is concerned and as far as the Appellants in this case· 
are concerned. All procedural steps taken prior to the May 
sale of 1941, have been conceded by the Appellants in this 
case, so there is no necessity of arguing and presenting the 
procedural steps. This contention is corroborated by the fact 
that the lower Court in its pretrial statement found that: 
(t (7) The Court finds that the only issues involved 
in the presentation of Plaintiff's case on the Complaint 
will be: (a) The adverse possession alleged in the 
Plaintiff which the Defendants deny, claiming that 
the possession was held in trust; (b) Whether the 
Plaintiff made improvements and the amount thereof." 
(Trans. 121). 
This finding of the Court in the pretrial order is also an ad-
mission on the part of the Defendants that the Plaintiff in 
this case had possession of the property during the entire 
time claimed, the Defendants, however, claiming the possession 
was held in trust for them. This further shows that they base 
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their defense on a trust agreement or fiduciary relationship 
of some kind which was not pr<?ved by the testimony or evi-
dence adduced at the trial. 
POINT 2 
1941 AUDITOR'S DEED-VALID OR INVALID-
CONSTITUTES COLOR OF TITLE AS A BASIS OF TITLE 
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION IN A. E. UPTON. 
The pretrial order (Tr. 121) states ccThe Defendants 
represented, however, do not admit the legal effect of said Ex-
hibits A, B, C, p, E, F and G, and do not admit that the 
Plaintiff obtained title there£rom except as trustee." It was 
the understanding of counsel for the Plaintiff in the case that 
the Defendants thereby admitted that title passed to the 
Plaintiff by virtue of these tax deeds, but claimed title passed 
to him only as trustee. Issue was joined on Appellants' alleged 
defenses of partnership, implied trust and/ or co-tenancy which 
they failed to prove. Counsel for Plaintiff interpret this to 
mean that Counsel for Defendants admit that this is a good 
and valid conveyance to A. E. Upton for the purpose of passing 
title, but that he held it only as a trustee. This is further 
corroborated by the paragraph (7) before quoted of the pre-
trial statement which shows the Court's and attorney's under-
standing of the stipulation, and that no evidence was required 
as to the validity and propriety of the auditor's tax deeds in-
volved evidenced by Exhibits A, B and C (Tr. 121). How-
ever, from the Brief of Appellants, it is apparent that Appel-
lants have had a change of mind since the ruling of the Court 
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below. Counsel· for Respondent in this · matter majntain th~t 
in. any event the auditor's tax deed gives color of ··title . to A. 
E .. Upton as a basis for adverse ·possession. This .Court has 
many times ·held. that a tax deed,·. even though void, .is suffi-
cient to give color of title. Lords v. Murphy, 147 P. 903, ,4-5 
Utah 612; Weiner v. Stearns, 120 P. 490, 40 Utah 185; Baker 
v. Goodman, 194P. 117, 57 Utah 349. 
POINT 3 
A. E. UPTON ALSO PERFECTED TITLE IN FEE UNDER 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Appellants in their brief continually recite allegations con-
tained . in their pleadings but cite no evidence adduced at 
the trial in support of those allegations. Nowhere in their 
appeal brief do Appellants attempt to make the facts in the 
case at bar conform to the facts contained in the authorities 
cited by them. In other words, they have taken certain 
authorities, and are assuming that the facts in this case cor-
respond with the facts in the cases cited. In the cases cited 
by the A ppellantes there was evidence, and it was found, 
that a co-tenancy or a partnership or an implied trust existed. 
Nowhere in their brief do they point to any evidence in· the 
record which would prove any of the allegations of co-tenancy, 
partnership or implied trust. 
The very least that can be said in behalf of the respondent 
in this case is that he took color of title as is pointed out in 
the preceding sections. Appellants admit that he went into 
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possession of said property at that time and has been in pos-
session ever since (Tr. 121), (Pretrial Order, paragraph 7). 
Appellants claim, however, that the possession of Respondent 
in such case was as trustee. Therefore, they tacitly admit 
his possession during the entire period in controversy. And 
Appellants have failed to prove the elements of any trust, 
implied or otherwise, as is hereinafter set forth (Respondent's 
Brief: Page 30-35.) The Respondent, A. E. Upton, not only 
went into possession and continued in open notorious and 
adverse possession during the entire period of time, but paid 
taxes on said property during the entire period of time. This 
was admitted by the Appellants in the pretrial order as is 
shown by Exhibits S, T and U, which the Appellants at the 
trial admitted subject to a check as to the figures contained 
therein being correct (Tr. 456, 457). The entire period of 
time referred to is all subsequent to the May sale of 1941, 
which is all subsequent to the second time that Respondent, 
A. E. Upton, purchased this property from the County. 
Respondent is not unmindful of the fact that the Supreme 
Court of this State ruled that the purchase of property at tax 
sale did not constitute the payment of taxes and that the de-
linquent taxes that led up to such tax sale could not be used 
as a part of the period of time under adverse possession. 
But Exhibits S, T and U show that the Respondent lpaid the 
taxes for the years 1941 to and including 1947, which is 
a full seven years, and the evidence in the case shows that the 
Respondent also paid the 1948 and 1949 taxes (Tr. 456, 
45 7) . Therefore, although the taX.es assessed and which 
constituted the basis for the County's title which they sold in 
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January, 1937 and in May, 1941 to A. E. Upton may not 
be used in computing the payment of taxes under adverse pos-
session, the period of time subsequent to the May, 1941 sale 
which included the taxes for the year, 1941, and all subsequent 
years were paid by the Respondent, A. E. Upton for more 
than seven years prior to filing this action. In showing the 
adverse possession by A. E. Upton since the May sale of 
1941, the evidence shows that one H. J. Watson, one of the 
witnesses for the Respondent, rented the property from A. 
E. Upton; that A. E. Upton made improvements on the property 
(Tr. Pages 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176 and 177). 'fhe 
Respondent, A. E. Upton, made improvements on the build-
ings on this property (Tr. Pages 194 and 195). This im-
provement was made in 1942 (Tr. Page 194). Further im-
provements were made in 1945 leading up to the rental by 
H. J. Watson (Tr. Pages 171 and 172). Also, in 1946 im-
provements were made while the Garffs were in possession 
as a contractee with the Respondent, A. E. Upton (Tr. Pages 
186, 187), in the sum of $5,780.19. Respon~ent, A. E. Upton, 
insured these properties since 1941 (Tr. 279, Ex. K). In 
addition and in furtherance of his claim of ownership as 
against the entire world, Mr. A. E. Upton on March 18, 
1946, entered into a contract for the sale of this property 
to Mark Gar!£ (Ex. I), and Mr. Garff went into possession 
of said property by virtue of said contract and is still in 
possession thereof. In said contract, the Respondent, A. E. 
Upton, agreed to quiet title to said property so as to give to 
the buyer a warranty deed. The possession of A. E. Upton 
on this land was open, notorious, uninterrupted and peaceful 
under claim of right, and will be presumed to have been from 
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its inception adverse as to the holder of legal title. Toltec 
Ranch Company v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876; affirmed 
191 U. S. 542, 48 Law. Ed. 294. 
Weiner v. Stearns, supra, states: 
ttTax sale initiates new title, and any possession that 
was taken by virtue of such new title is prima facie 
adverse to the original title." 
({Character of possession cannot always be deter-
mined from declarations of party in possession, but 
whenever possession is of such character that owner-
ship may be inferred therefrom then possession ordi-
narily may be presumed to be hostile to the rights of 
true owner, that is if party places permanent structures 
upon land belonging to another and uses land and 
structures the same as owner ordinarii y uses his land, 
then in absence of something showing contrary inten-
tion claim of ownership may be inferred in favor of 
party in possession." Pioneer Investment and Trust 
Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 
1, 99 P. 150. 
In the case at bar, A. E. Upton not only claimed owner-
ship, but he rented the property, he insured the property, he 
made improvements thereon, contracted to sell the property 
and in all manner acted as, and claimed to be, and was the 
true owner of said property. Appellants have in no place 
denied the adverse, open notorious possession of A. E. Upton; 
in fact, they admit the possession but claim it was as trustee, 
but they proved nothing to substantiate a trustee relationship 
(Tr. 120, 121). 
See also Baker v. Goodman, supra, where the Court held: 
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((Where the Defendant purchased tax deed from 
County and . immediately . entered into possession of 
property' paid taxes on property for statutory time, 
made. c valuable improvements on proper,ty and held 
property openly and notoriously, he was entitled to 
have title to property in controversy against all parties, 
except those under disability.'' 
In the case at bar, there are no parties under disability. 
POINT 4 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Respondent still relies on his allegations of Statute of 
Litnitations wherever applicable. 
Respondent herein by demurrer and by reply has pleaded 
the Statute of Limitations and continues to stand on all of 
the Statute of Limitations pleaded, and Respondent further 
avers that if the Court below had properly ruled on his special 
demurrer on the grounds of the Statute of Limitations that any 
claimed error on the part of the Appellants would not and 
could not have been admitted or produced. In view of the 
fact that no proof of an implied trust was adduced at the 
trial, all_ evidence submitted by the Defendants, Appellants 
herein, should have been stricken from the record. Under the 
pleaded Statute of Limitations the Court should have granted 
the motion for judgment on the pleadings made by attorneys 
for the Respondent at the commencement of the trial, and 
also at the pretrial of this case the overruling to which counsel 
for Respondent took exception (Tr. Pages 81, 88, 89, 124, 
128, 164 and 166). 
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POINT 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS APPLIES. 
All inadmissible evidence under the Statute of Frauds 
relating to transfers of interest in this land, except as to implied 
trust which was not proved, is still relied upon by Respondent. 
It is to be noted at the outset of this point, that L. H. 
Heiselt personally was not a former fee record owner of any 
interest in the land in question in this lawsuit (Ex. J, last 
seven pages). (Ex. H). Although Exhibit 1 of the J?e-
fendants is dated in 1936, the Court's attention is called to 
the fact that it was not delivered until 1944 or 1945 (Tr. 
289 to 301) and it was not recorded until May 13, 1946, and 
it is so stamped thereon. This is a case in which the Plaintiff, 
A. E. Upton, purchased certain lands in Salt Lake County 
in January, 1937, and then he orally agreed to sell the said 
lands to L. H. Heiselt upon payment by L. H. Heiselt to A. 
E. Upton of $1225.00 and interest thereon provided L. H. 
Heiselt pay each year the taxes thereon and thereafter as 
the same became due. This is an agreement between two 
people to purchase land from a third person, the County, 
and comes squarely within the statements of the case of Chad-
wick v. Arnold, 95 P. 527 at Page 530, 34 Utah 48, in which 
the Court states in part: 
((This brings us to the real question in the case: 
whether the statute of frauds applies to such case as 
testified to by the plaintiff. It, of course, is readily 
conceded that a mere oral agreement to purchase land 
from another is within the statute of frauds. So, too, 
it is conceded that if A, having no interest in the real 
estate, orally agrees with B that the latter should pur-
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chase it with his own funds and take the title in his 
own name, and that he should thereafter convey it to 
A upon an agreed price, no resulting or constructive 
trust arises, and that such a contract is also within the 
statute of frauds ... " The foregoing cases should be 
carefully distinguished from those in which there is a 
mere verbal promise to purchase and convey land. In 
order that the doctrine of trust ex maleficio with re-
spect to land may be enforced under any circum-
stances, there must be something more than a mere 
verbal promise, however unequivical, otherwise the 
statute of frauds would be virtually abrogated; there 
must be an element of positive fraud accompanying 
the promise, and by means of which the acquisition of 
the legal title is wrongfully consummated. Equity 
does not pretend to enforce verbal promises in the 
face of the statute; ... " 
POINT 6 
NO IMPLIED TRUST PROVED. 
In this case the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, did not live 
up to the verbal agreement and failed to pay the taxes as 
agreed (Tr. 250, 251). There is no fraud whatsover shown 
on the part of the Respondent, A. E. Upton; in fact, if any 
fraud is involved, it is on the part of L. H. Heiselt, who 
induced A. E. Upton to spend $1225.00 of his own money 
with the understanding that L. H. Heiselt would buy the 
property and pay the taxes on the property in question as they 
accrued after 1936. L. H. Heiselt fraudulently failed, neglected 
and did not pay any of these taxes, and when the property 
was up for tax sale again, in 1941, through no fault of the 
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.,; 
/ 
Respondent he was at that time required to and under necessity 
did again purchase the land from the County to protect his 
own investment therein. Furthermore, prior to the second 
purchase of the land in May, 1941 by the Respondent, A. E. 
Upton, the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, filed a petition in bank-
tuptcy in Colorado iti the year 1940, and in his schedules 
did not list any debt due A. E. Upton relative to this property 
and did not list this property in his assets, or any interest in 
this property. If the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, had at any 
time intended to purchase the property from A. E. Upton 
and pay A. E. Upton the said $1225.00 plus interest thereon 
and taxes, he had at this time abandoned any such intention. 
His verified bankruptcy petition admits an abandonment of 
any such intention or any claim under the oral arrangements 
made with Mr. Upton when title was taken in 193 7 to this 
property. It will be noted that the last seven pages of Exhibit 
J were on an unverified petition in bankruptcy filed approxi-
mately eight years after the original petition was filed, by the 
debtor therein who is one and. the same person as the L. H. 
Heiselt, the Appellant herein. 
In order for the Court of equity to find an implied or a 
constructive trust, it is necessary that fraud be shown on the 
part of the person on whom it is desired to impress the trust. 
In this case there is no evidence in any manner whatsover of 
fraud on the part of Mr. Upton. He is not realizing any profit 
or gain from the ownership of this property. He has paid for 
taxes and purchase price from Salt Lake County on said property 
in excess of $2700.00. In addition to that, he has realized 
no interest on his money since 1937. That there has been some 
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$6;ooo.oo:of improvements put upon the land and -in addition 
when this laws~it is terminated, -he will have to pay' his at-
torneys' fees and he is now out the cost of this proceeding 
up to this time. Mr. Upton is not only financially in the hole 
ir1this matter but he has agreed to sell and has entered into 
a contract of sale with Mark B. Garff for the sum of $3,000.00. 
If and when he realizes the total purchase price from this 
p~operty, he will suffer a financial loss in the transaction of 
approximately $1500.00. This is not a matter of a person 
attempting fraudulently to do another person out of money, 
but is purely and simply an attempt on the part of Mr. Upton 
to realize as small a loss as is possible in the transaction. In 
fact, all he is doing in this case is attempting to salvage as 
much as he can from a ccbum deal." Counsel for Appellants 
have laid much stress on the fact that in April or_ May of 1946, 
L. H. Heiselt went to Denver to the National City Bank of 
Denver, in an attempt to make some compromise in this matter 
with the Respondent, A. E. Upton, and the record further 
shows that when they went to the office of Ernest B. Upton 
in the Majestic Building in Denver, Colorado, Mr. Ernest B. 
Upton informed his brother, Mr. A. E. Upton, that he could 
not make any corr1promise about this property with Heiselt 
because he had already bound himself contractually with 
Mark B. Garff for the sale of this property, to which he agreed 
to quiet title and convey to Mark B. Garff, (Tr. 364). Counsel 
for Respondent particularly call the attention of the Court 
to the fact that the Mark B. Garff contract was made on 
March 18, 1946, and that it was a month or so thereafter that 
L. H. Heiselt attempted to negotiate with A. E. Upton. We 
use the word "negotiate" advisedly because in all the cor-
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respondence and so forth set forth in the exhibits of the Defend-
ants, is the word t~negotiate" which is synonymous with ncompro-
mise" and was ruled by the lower Court to be an attempted 
compromise when it rejected the Exhibits of the Defendaf?.tS 
numbered 17, 37 and 38 (Tr. 358-375). Certainly, in this 
case if any fraud has been visited by one person upon another 
as a result of the arrangement between the Appellant, L. H. 
Heiselt, and the Respondent, A. E. Upton, in January of 1937 
when this property was bought from Salt Lake County by 
A. E. Upton, the fraud was upon Upton as is clearly shown 
by all of the subsequent actions relative thereto. Had the 
Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, performed his part of that agree-
ment, and paid the taxes and purchased from A. E. Upton 
this property for the money expended by Upton plus interest, 
there would have been no argument whatsover. However, 
through the default of L. H. Heiselt, one of the Appellants, 
in failing to perform his part of that agreement and pay the 
taxes for the years subsequent to that purchase, and allowing 
that property to go to County title and to tax sale in May, 
1941, he forced the Respondent, A. E. Upton, to do what 
he did to protect his investment, and even after the May sale 
of 1941, six or seven years passed before L. H. Heiselt made 
any move toward claiming any of this property from A. E. 
Upton, or contesting his tax title or title by adverse possession 
thereof. 
If the trust agreement is neither a constructive nor a 
resulting trust, it must be an oral trust. This case does not 
meet the conditions necessary for an oral trust. 
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In the case of Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468; 175 P. (2d) 
470, 473, the Court stated: 
((The substance of the rules announced in those cases 
is that where a party seeks to establish a trust by parole, 
the evidence must be clear, convincing and unequivocal. 
The evidence must be clear and unambiguous. It must 
be convincing and satisfy the trier of the facts that it 
is free from fabrication. It must be definite, so that 
no doubt is left as to the subject matter of the trust 
or trust res, or the rights and obligations of benficiaries 
and trustee. Testimony which is designed to establish 
a trust must be carefully scrutinized to ascertain whether 
it is so attended with such circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness that it it entitled to credence. The 
evidence must clearly show not merely an intention 
to create a trust, but some act or declaration sufficient 
to show that such intention was properly carried into 
effect. See Hanson v. Hanson, Utah, 171 P. (2d) 
392. None of the elements of a trust can be left to 
conjecture. The evidence must be such that it will 
clearly lead to the conclusion that a specific property 
in controversy is held by the person sought to be 
charged as trustee, for the use and benefit of others. 
((Does the evidence in this case meet the tests of 
(Evidence which is clear, unequivocal, satisfactory and 
convincing?' To determine this question, we must 
scrutinize the entire record, including the exhibits, and 
the relationship of the parties; for what may constitute 
adequate proof in one situation may not be satsifactory 
evidence in the light of other relationships. If the 
claims made in view of the established circumstances 
are inherently improbable, or happen to have been 
asserted under circumstances which would infer that 
they are are result of (wishful thinking,' the evidence 
would be considered unsatisfactory . . . It is the 
function of Courts of equity to enforce obligations 
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which were created by acts of the parties, not to fashion 
new obligations out of rights improvidently estab-
lished.'' 
POINT 7 
NO PARTNERSHIP PROVED 
Section 69-1-3 and Section 69-1-4 of U. C. A. 1943, 
defines a partnership and sets forth some rules for determining 
the existence of a partnership. A perusal of the evidence 
adduced by the Appellants at the trial of this matter failed 
to show any proof of the necessary elements of a partnership. 
The most that can be said is that Mr. Upton and Mr. Peterson 
and the National City Bank of Denver loaned monies to L. 
H. Heiselt, individually, and the Heiselt Construction Com-
pany in connection with the financing of the operations under 
its contract with the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad. The 
evidence adduced at the trial by both parties shows that the 
monies received from Mr. Upton and Mr. Peterson and the 
National City Bank of Denver were entirely loans; that those 
loans, together with interest, were repaid at various and sundry 
times (Tr. 263-289, 314, 317, 431-449, 452, 467-470). The 
evidence clearly shows that the Heiselt Construction Company 
and L. H. Heiselt were in a low financial condition; that these 
loans were made perhaps through a past friendship and without 
any particular amount of security. It is a fact that banks 
or individuals sometimes loan money on the force of contracts 
that the borrower has with strong companies such as the Denver 
& Rio Grande Railroad, and expect to receive the repayment 
of their loans together with interest on the force and faith 
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of those contracts. · Furthermore; in instances wherein the 
s~turity is nil, or very shaky 'and the risk is gre~t, the investi: 
gations by the loaning agency or loaning individual is ·much 
greater than in cases where the security for the loan is of low · 
risk and adequately covers the .loan. In this case, it is true 
that Mr. Upton went about to determine the status and nature 
of the progress of the work, because of the risky condition of 
the security; it is true that he made trips around to look over 
the equipment, real property and other ~hings that the con-
struction company claimed it had with which to perform these 
contracts. It would be the grossest type of business inefficiency 
for a loaning agency or a person loaning money not to make a 
thorough investigation of the assets, abilities, etc., of the 
borrowers. The most that can be said of all of the evidence 
adduced by the Defendants at the trial as to the activities of 
Upton in going over the works and camps in connection with 
the performance of the Rio Grande contracts is that it was 
purely by way of determining whether or not their loans were 
safe, whether or not there was adequate probability of a 
repayment thereof. Nowhere in the evideNce is it shown 
that Mr. Upton, the National City Bank of Denver or E. H. 
Peterson received from L. H. Heiselt or the Heiselt Construction 
Company a cent more than the principal and interest on 
these loans. In one instance a $3,000.00 mortgage to real 
estate ad joining the property here in question was taken 
and a case was filed in 1943 in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
to realize on that part of the numerous loans that were made 
in connection with the work under the contract of the Ap· 
pellants with the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad. The 
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Appellants in the lower Court in the trial of the case at bar 
made no effort whatever to show that A. E. Upton, Elmer H. 
Peterson or the National City Bank of Denver participated in 
any manner whatsoever in the profits from those contracts. 
In fact, they make no effort to show what profits or losses were 
made on those contracts, and make no effort whatsoever to 
show that there "ras anything received by Elmer H. Peterson, 
A. E. Upton or the National City Bank of Denver from those 
profits. On the contrary, a perusal of the entire trial shows 
that the matters were purely loans accompanied by investiga-
tions. The Court's attention is called to the fact that the 
$1225.00 of the personal money of A. E. Upton with which 
he bought the lands in litigation in this case in January of 
1937 had nothing to do with the operation or performance 
of the contracts between the Appellants and the Denver & 
Rio Grande Railroad. 
40 Am. Jur. 145, under the Title C(Partnership," sub-title 
UD," ((Tests for Indicia of Partnership," Sections 32 et seq, 
sets forth in full the necessary elements of a partnership. 
It is submitted that the evidence adduced in this case fails to 
show a partnership and the necessary elements of a partnership 
are entire! y lacking. 
The evidence as shown by Exhibits M and N and 0, which 
are contracts between the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad and 
the Heiselt Construction Company, a Corporation, and the 
income tax returns of the Heiselt Construction Company, a 
Utah corporation, which L. H. Heiselt himself admitted re-
flected all of the income and business transactions with respect 
to those Rio Grande Railroad Company contracts, conclusively 
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show that the work and operations in connection with the con-
tracts with the Rio Grande Railroad Company were not partner-
ship contracts or activities, but Heiselt Construction Company 
activities. This is corroborated by the fact that in Exhibit 
J, which is the petition in bankruptcy of the Defendant, L. H. 
I-!eiselt, there is ( 1) no claim that he is one of the alleged part-
ners, (2) nor any claimed partnership or partnership activiti~s, 
and assets, ( 3) nor any claim to any property of a partnership 
such as he alleges between himself, A. E. Upton and E. H. Peter-
son. The bankruptcy petition was filed in 1940, which was about 
four years after the completion of all of the contracts and 
work for the Denver & Rio Brande Railroad. Clearly, from 
the record it is apparent that the idea of a partnership in 
connection with any of these matters is an afterthought on the 
part of L. H. Heiselt. 
Th Court's attention is called to the fact that there was 
no written agreement of partnership. Appellants attempted 
by their evidence to try to convert the activities and operations 
in connection with the contract between the Rio Grande 
Railroad and Heiselt Construction Company into an activity 
of a so-called partnership between L. H. Heiselt, A. E. Upton 
and Elmer H. Peterson, but failed to do so. 
An abstract from 40 Am. Jur. Page 130, under the title 
of ((Partnership" Section 6, reads: 
((Public policy does not permit a co-partnership to 
do business under the guise of a corporation, or allow 
the partners to be a corporation as to the rest of the 
world while as between themselves the enterprise con-
ducted in the corporate form is in fact a joint venture 
of partnership ( 5) ." 
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Note 5 cites Seitze v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102; 
12 A.L.R. 1060; also Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 
75 A. 568, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658. 
As \Yas stated before, there was no partnership proved. 
The necessary elements in no respect were shown, and the 
Respondent denies that there was any partnership whatever. 
Certainly, there could not be the type of a partnership as is 
alleged by the Appellants, being against public policy as here-
inbefore cited. It is quite apparent that the partnership idea, 
or the idea that there ever was a partnership was an afterthought 
on the part of L. H. Heiselt and a figment of the imagination. 
POINT 8 
NO CO-TENANCY PROVED 
It is the contention of the Respondent that there was no 
showing whatever in the record of a co-tenancy relationship 
between A. E. Upton, L. H. Heiselt, E. H. Peterson, Heiselt 
Construction Company or any of the other Defendants. In 
Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., Vol. 4, Page 366, 
Sec. 1831, under ccEssential Attributes of a Tenancy in Com-
mon," it is stated: 
CCA tenancy in common exists where property is held 
by several distinct titles by unity of possession, neither 
knowing his own severalty, and, therefore they all oc-
cupy promiscuously. It is not an estate, but a relation be-
tween persons. A tenant in common has as such no 
interest in his co-tenant's title to the common property. 
The only unity of tenants in common in the property 
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heid by th~rrt as sl.lch by several "'and distinct titles· is 
unity of possession. No unity other than that ·of pos,. 
,. ., session is essential to a tenancy in common, and, h~nc~, 
the destruction of any of the other unities of a joint 
tenancy changes the estate to . one in common. Unity 
of possession, however is the very essence of a ·tenancy 
in common; without it, such a tenancy cannot exist. 
It is an essential attribute of a tenancy in common that 
there shall be ·a unity of possession or of the right to 
possession in two or more persons .... " 
It is submitted that nowhere in the testimony of the De-
fendants, or otherwise in the Court below, is there any showing 
to establish the necessary attributes of a tenancy in common. 
POINT 9 
MORTGAGOR-MORTGAGEE RELATIONSHIP IM-
MATERIAL. 
For the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
Appellants make the contention and claim that the payment 
·of $1225.00 by the Respondent to Salt Lake County, in January, 
193 7, and taking the tax deeds that are represented by Exhibits 
D, E, F and G is and gave rise to a mortgagor-mortgagee rela-
tionship. The evidence at the trial and the testimony of A. 
·E. Upton and L. H. Heiselt indicate that when A. E. Upton 
bought the tax deeds from the County represented by Exhibits 
D, E, F, and G, and paid the $1225.00, he actually purchased 
this ground in which L. H. Heiselt individually had no interest, 
and that there was some oral agreement that if Heiselt would 
pay all of the taxes subsequent thereto and buy the property 
from A. E. Upton for the $1225.00 plus interest, that A. E. 
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Upton would sell it to L. H. Heiselt. If that was a conditional 
sales agreement, it was oral. It seems that such oral sales 
agreement might be within the ~tatute of frauds and not bind-
ing on A. E. Upton. Even if it wasn't L. H. Heiselt failed to 
meet the terms of the oral conditional sales contract, if any, 
by not paying the taxes, and by taking out bankruptcy without 
listing any debts or claims with respect to this property in 
either Schedules A or B thereof, and then permitting this 
property to go to county tax title and be resold in 1941. 
This Supreme Court in the case of Smyth v. Reed, et ux, 
28 Utah 262, 78 P. 478, had the question of whether a situation 
involved a conditional sales contract or mortgage. In that 
case this Court held that, where the one person sold to another 
by absolute conveyance and then received back a separate 
instrument whereby the Seller could under certain terms 
and conditions repurchase from. his grantee, that that 
was not a mortgage but a conditional sale, in that there 
was no clear, convincing unequivical proof that it was intended 
as a mortgage. This case is somewhat in poi!lt on the results. 
However, the fact remains that L. H. Heiselt had no prior 
interest in this property, and even if he did, that case would 
still apply. The case here in issue is stronger in favor of the 
Respondent for the reason that there can not be a mortgagor-
mortgagee relationship between L. H. Heiselt and A. E. 
Upton because the mortgagor must have some interest in the 
real property that is the subject matter of the mortgage. Here 
Heiselt did not (Tr. Pages 250, 251). 
Appellants contend in their Point V on Points to be Relied 
Upon (Appellants' Brief, Page 16) that when A. E. Upton 
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bought the property herein in litigation from Salt Lake County 
in January of 1937, the .deeds were intended as a mortgage 
and that L. H. Heiselt, the individual, was the mortgagor and 
A. E. Upton was the mortgagee. 
Even if the tax deeds to A. E. Upton from the County 
in 19 3 7 are considered to be a mortgage, which the Respondent 
here definitely denies, under the authorities Heiselt can not 
sustain recovery anyway. The record definitely shows that 
it was the obligation of L. H. Heiselt to pay the taxes on this 
Property under the oral conditional sales agreement with Upton 
-he failed to do that-and there is no showing whatever 
that A. E. Upton was obligated, if we consider him as a mort-
gagee, which he denies, to pay any taxes at all. So, in the 
sale of May, 1941, any mortgagee who was not under obliga-
tion to pay the taxes could have gone to the tax sale and 
bought that property and his tax title would have been valid 
and the ownership would have passed to him. With respect 
to the holdings of the Court as to the purchase by a mortgagee 
at the May sales from the County, where mortgagee is under 
no obligation to pay taxes, attention is called to the dissenting 
opinions of Justice Folland and Justice Wolfe in the case of 
Hadlock· v. Benjamin Drainage District, 89 Utah 94, 53 P. 1 
(2d) 1156,_ 106 A. L. R. 876, 881 et seq and 883 et seq. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for Respondent respectfully submit that the Ap-
pellants conceded the validity of the tax deeds held by the 
Respondent, and particularly the tax deeds of the Mav sale 
' 
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of 1941; that even if there is some question as to validity of 
the tax deeds, the Respondent obtained good fee title by 
adverse possession based upon these tax and auditor's deeds 
as color of title; that the Appellants have failed to prove 
partnership, implied trust, tenancy in common or any fiduciary 
relationship, which were the bases of their defenses; that the 
Defendants' contention of mortgagor-mortgagee relationship 
which is brought up for the first time on appeal can avail 
them nothing, under the facts, for the reason that the Appellant 
L. H. Heiselt was under obligation to pay these taxes and failed 
to do so, and the Respondent, even if he may be considered 
a mortgagee, was under no obligation to pay the taxes and the 
title he obtained in the May sale of 1941 is a good and valid 
title. 
Therefore, Counsel for the Respondent respectfully sub-
mit that the lower Court should be affirmed in its judgment 
and decree in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MUSSER, GIBSON, MUSSER and 
CHRISTENSEN. 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
307 Utah Oil Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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